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A STUDY IN FUTILITY:
ABIGAIL ALLIANCE FOR BETTER ACCESS
TO DEVELOPMENTAL DRUGS WILL NOT EXPAND ACCESS TO
EXPERIMENTAL DRUGS FOR THE TERMINALLY ILL
Ashley Ochs ∗
Desperate times call for desperate measures.
I.

1

INTRODUCTION

In 2008, it was estimated that 565,650 Americans would die of
2
cancer, accounting for one of every four deaths in the United States.
Doctors expected to diagnose 1,437,180 new patients with cancer
throughout 2008, bringing the U.S. cancer population to over ten
3
million. While many of the cancers diagnosed are curable or manageable, others continue to remain deadly. These terminally ill patients are left desperate and willing to try just about anything regardless of the possibility of a cure or relief. Patients who believe they
have nothing to lose have demanded faster turnaround of approval of
drug treatment options, forcing the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) and the drug approval process into the spotlight. Particularly,
these patients challenge the balance the government maintains between consumer protection and access to experimental treatments
for terminally ill patients for whom no options exist. Some cancer
organizations—representing members with personal and devastating
stories about their loved ones’ struggle with cancer—have tried to
sway the power away from the FDA by attempting to tip the balance
between safety and efficacy in favor of providing the right of termi∗

J.D. candidate, May 2009, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2002,
Georgetown University. The author would like to thank Dean Boozang for her invaluable guidance throughout the writing process.
1
A translation of the Latin proverb “extremis malis extrema remedia” or “extreme remedies for extreme ills.”
2
AMERICAN CANCER SOCIETY, CANCER FACTS & FIGURES 2008, at 2 (2008), available
at http://www.cancer.org/downloads/STT/2008CAFFfinalsecured.pdf.
3
Id. at 1.
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nally ill patients to access experimental drugs. At the same time, a
year of embarrassments involving such controversial medications as
Vioxx has subjected the FDA to severe criticism about whether it is
4
sufficiently protecting the public from dangerous drugs. This clash
of patient autonomy and consumer protection came to a head in a
lawsuit filed by Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental
Drugs (Alliance), which sought access for the terminally ill to post–
Phase I experimental drugs.
In August 2007, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, sitting en banc, vacated the prior panel’s decision
in Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von Eschenbach, which decreed that terminally ill patients had a fundamental
constitutional right to access experimental drugs that had only been
5
through Phase I testing. Prior to the en banc ruling, the panel had
ruled that patients could have access to drugs tested solely for safety,
6
with no evidence of efficacy. In what appeared to be a huge defeat
in increasing experimental intervention options for dying patients,
Alliance was not deterred and filed a petition for writ of certiorari in
7
the Supreme Court of the United States.
In January 2008, the Supreme Court denied Alliance’s petition
for writ of certiorari refusing to weigh in on where the balance
8
should be struck between patients’ rights and consumer protection.
While Alliance considers its next move—to pursue its cause in an4

Ensuring Drug Safety: Where Do We Go from Here: Hearing of the Comm. on Health,
Educ., Labor, and Pensions, 109th Cong. 3–4 (2005) (statement of Sen. Edward M.
Kennedy).
5
Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von Eschenbach,
445 F.3d 470 (D.C. Cir. 2006), vacated en banc, 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1069 (2008). Numerous amicus curiae briefs were filed on behalf of
both parties to the litigation. For the government, the following parties filed briefs:
American Society of Clinical Oncology; National Coalition for Cancer Survivorship;
Association of American Medical Colleges; National Organization for Rare Disorders;
AIDS Action Baltimore; United Leukodystrophy Foundation; Neurofibromatosis,
Inc.; Kennedy’s Disease Association; National Ataxia Foundation; and the National
Alopecia Areata Foundation. See D.C. Court of Appeals Docket, Abigail Alliance for
Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir.
2007) (No. 04-5350). For Alliance, the following individuals filed briefs: economists
including John Calfee, Daniel Klein, Sam Peltzman, Alex Tabarrok, and Benjamin
Zycher; Dr. Emil Freireich from The University of Texas M.D. Anderson Cancer Center; and Dr. Stephen Strum. Id.
6
Abigail Alliance, 445 F.3d at 486.
7
Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von Eschenbach,
495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc), petition for cert. filed, 76 U.S.L.W. 3373 (U.S.
Sept. 28, 2008) (No. 07-444).
8
Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von Eschenbach,
495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1069 (2008).
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other federal jurisdiction—the question left unanswered is whether
all of this litigation will be productive in accomplishing Alliance’s
goal of increasing access to experimental drugs. The gaping hole in
Alliance’s strategy is how patients will obtain experimental drugs. Patients cannot compel pharmaceutical companies, which are non-state
actors, to fulfill such a right. Therefore, Alliance presumably expects
drug companies to voluntarily sell these experimental substances.
However, this Comment proceeds on the presumption that drug
companies will be unwilling to provide experimental drugs due to the
cost, ethical concerns, practical infeasibilities, and potential tort
claim liability.
This Comment proposes that the resources of the Court should
not be consumed with deciding whether there is a fundamental right
to access experimental drugs. Such a decision will prove futile because the result will not increase access to experimental drugs for the
terminally ill. Ultimately, this Comment argues that the success of
providing increased access to experimental drugs—regardless of
changes implemented by Congress, the judiciary, or the FDA’s regulations—will depend on the participation of the drug companies;
more specifically, success will depend on tailoring a program to offer
adequate incentives to drug manufacturers while not sacrificing patients’ rights. Part II traces the history of the FDA drug approval
process. Part III examines the Abigail Alliance organization and the
procedural history of its litigation. Part IV evaluates the claim that Alliance’s litigation was and will continue to be futile because the
pharmaceutical companies will remain unwilling to provide medication voluntarily in light of their legal, financial, and ethical constraints. Part V analyzes the proposed congressional legislation and
FDA regulation addressing Alliance’s demands. Part VI suggests that
the FDA’s regulatory proposal offers the most promising compromise
for Alliance, provided the amendments can be adapted to include incentives for drug company participation in expanded access programs.
II. HISTORY OF THE FDA APPROVAL PROCESS
A. Federal Food and Drug Act of 1906
Drug-related public health problems evoked support for a uniform national regulation of the drug market, prompting Congress to
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pass the Federal Food and Drug Act of 1906 (“1906 Act”). The 1906
Act was aimed at banning both the manufacture and distribution of
10
“adulterated and misbranded” drugs. While the 1906 Act allowed
the government to seize non-conforming drugs and prosecute offenders, the law was circumscribed in its focus to ensure that drugs
adhered to a prescribed standard of strength, quality, or purity; and
that a drug’s label accurately complied with the contents of the pack11
age. Essentially, the 1906 Act centered on making misrepresentation illegal, which satisfy customer expectations by guaranteeing that
12
drugs were what they claimed to be. To this end, the 1906 Act was
amended in 1912 to expand the notion of “misbranding” to also include false and misleading statements on labels as to the curative or
13
Importantly, the 1906 Act lacked any
remedial effects of drugs.
evaluation of the safety or effectiveness of new drugs entering the
14
market. The implications of this shortfall became apparent in 1937
when over 100 people died after ingesting a new antibiotic, Elixir Sulfanilamide, which unbeknownst to the public, was the equivalent of
15
antifreeze. In reaction to the public outcry over this tragedy, Con16
gress passed the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) of 1938,
9

Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768 (1906), repealed by Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat.
1040 (1938) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 301 (2000)); PETER HUTT ET AL.,
FOOD AND DRUG LAW 9 (3d ed. 2007). Uniform national regulation was strongly supported because the multitude of varying state statutes caused mischief, confusion,
and embarrassment. HUTT, supra, at 9. A national tragedy—the distribution of tetanus infected diphtheria antitoxins which led to the death of several children—
assisted in pushing the need for national regulation of the food and drug supply to
the forefront of concerns. Id.
10
Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906, § 1. Under the 1906 Act, a drug was found
adulterated when it differed from the established standard of strength, quality, or
purity and if its strength or purity was below the professed standard or quality under
which it was sold. Id. § 7. Additionally, according to the 1906 Act, a drug was misbranded if it was an imitation of a drug or offered for sale under the name of another drug, if the contents of the package had been removed and replaced with
other drugs, or if the packaging failed to have a statement of the quantity of a long
list of substances including alcohol, heroin, and chloroform. Id. § 8.
11
Id. §§ 7–8, 11.
12
Id. §§ 7–8.
13
Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906, amended by 37 Stat. 416 (1912). See United
States v. Johnson, 221 U.S. 488 (1911) (holding that false and misleading statements
on labels referring to curative or remedial effects of the drug were not considered
misbranding under the 1906 Act).
14
Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906, §§ 1–13.
15
PETER TEMIN, TAKING YOUR MEDICINE: DRUG REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES
42–43 (1980).
16
FDCA of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1932) (codified as amended
at 21 U.S.C. § 301 (2000)).
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which set the stage for modern-day drug regulation by shifting atten17
tion to the safety of drugs before distribution to the market.
B. Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938
Embarking on a new era of drug regulation, the FDCA required
18
manufacturers of all “new drugs” to file a new drug application
(NDA) with the FDA including the appropriate scientific and medical
19
data supporting the drug’s safety. Once all information was filed,
20
the FDA had sixty days to determine if the drug was unsafe. If this
deadline passed without any FDA contact, the drug was automatically
21
“approved” for manufacturing and distribution. If a manufacturer
was put on notice by the FDA within the sixty-day time period, the
FDA placed the new drug application on hold for up to 180 days in
22
order to further study and investigate the drug and the application.
All applicants received an opportunity for a hearing with the FDA to
23
establish the adequacy of their reports on the drug’s safety. After
such due process, the FDA suspended all applications which failed to
effectively show the new drug was safe for distribution under the
24
conditions of use upon which the application was based. Hence,
the 1938 version of the FDCA expanded the FDA’s ability to regulate
25
Hownew drug manufacturing and distribution based on safety.
ever, the FDCA lacked a requirement for “affirmative” pre-market
17

Id.
FDCA of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1932) (codified as amended
at 21 U.S.C. § 321(p) (2000)). A “new drug” under the 1938 FDCA was defined as
Any drug . . . the composition of which is such that such drug is not
generally recognized, among experts . . . as safe and effective for use
under the conditions prescribed, recommended, or suggested . . . [or]
any drug . . . the composition of which is such that such drug, as a result of investigations to determine its safety and effectiveness for use
under such conditions, has become so recognized, but which has not,
otherwise than in such investigations, been used to a material extent or
for a material time under such conditions.
Id.
19
FDCA of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1932) (codified as amended
at 21 U.S.C. § 355(a)(1)(2000)). The FDCA of 1938 required that a full report of the
investigations on a drug’s safety be submitted including a full list of the components
of the drug, full description of the method used in manufacturing and packing the
drug, and samples of the drug and the proposed labeling. Id.
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
FDCA of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as amended
at 21 U.S.C. § 355(a)(1)(2000)).
18
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approval by the FDA for new drugs because NDAs were deemed approved after a sixty-day time period unless steps were taken to reject
26
the application and prove the drug was dangerous.
C. Kefauver-Harris Amendments of 1962
Congress dramatically revised the FDA approval process with the
Kefauver-Harris Amendments of 1962 (“1962 Amendments”) to require that new drugs receive pre-market approval from the FDA
27
based on safety and effectiveness. The 1962 Amendments were triggered by America’s “close call” with the drug Thalidomide in the
28
1950s.
1.

The Thalidomide Tragedy

Thalidomide was developed in Germany and became widely
used by the late 1950s in Europe as a morning sickness medication
29
for pregnant women. In September 1960, Richardson-Merrell Inc.,
which signed a contract to sell Thalidomide in the United States, ap30
plied for FDA approval of the new drug. According to the FDCA of
1938, the FDA had only sixty days to review the company’s drug application before the drug would be automatically approved for distri31
bution, leaving plenty of time for Richardson-Merrell to meet its
32
1961 target distribution date. A year and a half prior to Merrell’s
submission of its NDA, the company began distributing Thalidomide
33
for investigational use in clinical trials.
Merrell dispersed nearly
2,500,000 tablets to nearly 20,000 patients—including 624 pregnant
34
women—while the drug was awaiting FDA approval.
By the early 1960s, Thalidomide had been strongly linked to a
rare birth defect in Europe called phocomelia—a shortening and de-

26

Id.
Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (1962) (codified
in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–381 (2000)).
28
108 CONG. REC. H21058 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1962) (statement of Rep. Sullivan
acknowledging that without the media coverage on Thalidomide and Dr. Frances
Kelsey from the FDA there might never have been any changes to the FDCA).
29
Sue McGrath, Only a Matter of Time: Lessons Unlearned at the Food and Drug Administration Keep Americans at Risk, 60 FOOD DRUG L.J. 603, 606–07 (2005).
30
Id.
31
See supra text accompanying notes 20–22.
32
McGrath, supra note 29, at 607.
33
Id. at 608.
34
Joseph Sanders, The Bendectin Litigation: A Case Study in the Life Cycle of Mass
Torts, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 301, 314 (1992).
27
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formity of the limbs resembling the extremities of a seal. Mothers
who had taken Thalidomide in West Germany bore between 3500
and 5000 babies afflicted with phocomelia in 1962 alone—prior to
36
this, physicians rarely diagnosed a single case in an entire career.
Fortunately and largely by chance, the United States, in comparison
to many parts of the world where Thalidomide had been distributed,
37
largely escaped this tragedy due to Dr. Frances Kelsey at the FDA.
After reviewing Merrell’s application, Dr. Kelsey found deficiencies in
its studies and on the fifty-eighth day, two days before the drug would
have been automatically approved for sale, placed the Thalidomide
38
application on hold. The application was subsequently postponed
numerous times, and in March 1962 Merrell withdrew its applica39
tion.
All in all, Thalidomide caused 10,000 children in forty-six
countries to be born with deformities; only seventeen were born in
40
America.
2.

The Aftermath of Thalidomide: The Passage of the
1962 Amendments

While prior attempts to reform the 1938 FDCA had been unsuccessful, the “close call” with Thalidomide forced the government to
re-evaluate the drug approval process and specifically to examine the
FDA’s limited authority to prevent pervasive use of an unproven, in41
sidious drug. Hence, Congress enacted the 1962 Amendments and
replaced the pre-market notification system with pre-market approval
42
both for safety and effectiveness for all new drugs. These changes
converted the FDA’s role to a proactive participant acting as a con43
sumer protection watchdog in the drug approval process.

35

108 CONG. REC. H21058–59 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1962) (statement of Rep. Sullivan quoting a report from the Associated Press).
36
Id.
37
Id. at 21072 (statement of Rep. Yates).
38
McGrath, supra note 29, at 608; Linda Bren, Frances Oldham Kelsey: FDA Medical
Reviewer Leaves Her Mark on History, FDA CONSUMER MAG., Mar.–Apr. 2001, at 24,
available at http://www.fda.gov/fdac/features/2001/201_kelsey.html (last visited
Sept. 2, 2008).
39
McGrath, supra note 29, at 608.
40
Bren, supra note 38.
41
See 108 CONG. REC. H21070 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1962) (statement of Rep.
Reuss).
42
Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (1962) (codified
in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–381(2000)); see 108 CONG. REC. H21058–73
(daily ed. Sept. 27, 1962).
43
See TEMIN, supra note 15, at 125.
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The 1962 Amendments control today’s drug approval process.
Manufacturers must obtain pre-market FDA approval by submitting
for review to the FDA sufficient evidence of safety and effectiveness of
44
any new drug. The FDA also exercises authority over new drug pre45
Addiapproval events, especially clinical trials involving humans.
tionally, the FDA has post-market jurisdiction over safety, advertise46
ments, and promotions.
D. Current Drug Approval Procedure
The process for drug approval is complicated, time-consuming,
and expensive. Before even submitting a new drug application, a
manufacturer must conduct clinical studies designed to show the
47
drug is both safe and effective. The process begins with an investigational new drug (IND) application to commence clinical testing on
48
humans. These IND applications generally follow pre-clinical testing on animals to get initial projections on safety that takes about 3.5
49
years. Pre-approval testing on humans involves three separate phas50
es of investigative studies.
1.

Phase I Testing

Phase I testing entails the initial introduction of the experimen51
52
tal drug in humans and usually lasts about a year, involving be53
tween twenty and eighty healthy volunteers. The studies seek “to
determine the metabolism and pharmacologic actions of the drugs in
humans, the side effects associated with increasing doses, and, if pos54
sible, to gain early evidence of effectiveness.” Essentially, Phase I
tests are designed to study metabolism and toxicity, but these tests
provide only preliminary information on safety and possibly no in55
formation regarding efficacy. It is important not to accord more
44

21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2000).
Id. § 355(b)(5).
46
See id. § 355(e), § 352(n); 21 C.F.R. 202.1 (2007).
47
21 U.S.C. § 355(b).
48
Id.
49
Elizabeth M. Rutherford, The FDA and “Privatization”—The Drug Approval Process, 50 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 203, 212 (1995).
50
21 C.F.R. § 312.21 (2007).
51
Id. § 312.21(a)(1).
52
Rutherford, supra note 49, at 213.
53
21 C.F.R. § 312.21(a)(1).
54
Id.
55
Susan Okie, Access Before Approval—A Right to Take Experimental Drugs?, 355 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 437, 438 (2006).
45
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weight than is appropriate to the results of a Phase I study; Phase I
studies are basically assuring that a new drug does not poison a sub56
ject. Phase I is usually the safest phase for human testing because it
involves healthy volunteer subjects, low doses, and close medical su57
pervision. However, disasters do happen. Recent Phase I trials re58
sulted in one death and six serious adverse effects. The Center for
Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER), which oversees testing under
the FDCA, can place a study on a clinical hold if it has concerns over
59
safety or a sponsor’s insufficient risk disclosure.
2.

Phase II Testing

Phase II testing increases the controlled trial group to several
hundred subjects and is meant to evaluate “the effectiveness of the
drug for a particular indication in patients with the disease or condition under study and to determine the common short-term side ef60
fects and risks associated with the drug.” Phase II clinics can last
61
about two years. The FDA requires that these trials be adequate and
well controlled studies which allow identification of the effects of the
drug to be shown from other influences other than the specific
62
chemicals that are being tested. As such, most clinical trials involve
comparisons to control groups that receive placebos or the current
best treatment, randomized assignment to treatment, and blinded
63
outcome assessment. Because study participants have the possibility
of either unknowingly receiving the experimental drug or a placebo,
and because the drug being tested has not yet been proven effec64
tive, a critical distinction for all participants in clinical trials must be
56

Rita Rubin, Unapproved Drugs Ignite Life-and-Death Debate; Lawsuit Pits Desperately
Ill Against Hard Bureaucratic Realities, USA TODAY, Apr. 2, 2007, at 1A (quoting BioEthicist Arthur Caplan from the University of Pennsylvania).
57
21 C.F.R. § 312.21(a)(1).
58
See generally S.E. Raper et al., Fatal Systemic Inflammatory Response Syndrome in an
Orinthine Transcarbanylase Deficient Patient Following Adenoviral Gene Transfer, 80
MOLECULAR GENETICS METABOLISM 148 (2003) (discussing the death of Jesse Gelsinger); Ganesh Suntharalingam et al., Cytokine Storm in a Phase I Trial of the Anti-CD28
Monoclonal Antibody TGN1412, 355 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1018 (2006) (serious adverse reactions on six healthy patients).
59
The CDER Handbook, The New Development and Review Process: Phase I
Clinical Studies, http://www.fda.gov/cder/handbook/phase1.htm (last visited Sept.
3, 2008).
60
21 C.F.R. § 312.21(b).
61
Rutherford, supra note 49, at 213.
62
P.P. De Deyn & R. D’Hooge, Placebos in Clinical Practice and Research, 22 J. MED.
ETHICS 140, 140–41 (1996).
63
Id.
64
Id.

OCHS (FINAL)

568

4/6/2009 11:21:59 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:559

made indicating that their involvement in the trial is not experimen65
Phase II studies are not
tal therapy but an experimental study.
meant to treat but are intended solely to evaluate whether the sub66
stances at issue offer therapeutic benefits. Physicians must follow
protocol, from which they may not deviate even if they believe it is in
67
Participants are consethe participant’s best medical interest.
quently referred to as subjects instead of patients to solidify this dis68
tinction. However, despite this distinction, most subjects are motivated to join clinical trials due to the recruitment efforts of their
69
physician, hope for personal benefit, and lack of alternative options
70
for their own treatment.
To become a participant in Phase II trials, patients must satisfy
71
specific eligibility criteria. These may include a particular age, gender, medical history, current health status, and type or stage of dis72
ease.
These initial trials do not involve participation by minors;
however, the FDA mandates that sponsors must incorporate children
73
in testing if the drug is specifically marketed for children. Additionally, clinical trials usually take place at cancer centers, medical
centers, community hospitals, specialized centers, and doctors’ of74
fices, possibly requiring subjects to travel great lengths to participate. All research involving human subjects is governed by federal

65

Frances H. Miller, Symposium Trust Relationships Part 1 of 2: Trusting Doctors:
Tricky Business When It Comes to Clinical Research, 81 B.U. L. REV. 423, 433 (2001).
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
There exists the possibility for a conflict of interest between a physician and his
referral to his patient to enter a clinical study when the physician is being compensated by a sponsor with the receipt of “finder’s fees.” Jesse A. Goldner, Dealing with
Conflicts of Interest in Biomedical Research: IRB Oversight as the Next Best Solution to the Abolitionist Approach, 28 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 379, 381–82 (2000). Additionally, a recent
trend in clinical research has been the shift from research of investigators at academic medical centers to private physicians running and directing research as a physician-investigator. Jason E. Klein & Alan R. Fleischman, The Private Practicing Physician-Investigator: Ethical Implications of Clinical Research in the Office Setting, 32 HASTING
CTR. RPT., July–Aug. 2002, at 22–24. This new dual role of physicians creates conflicts
of interests between the physician and his patients when sponsors are compensating
the physician to recruit, retain, and study research subjects. Id.
70
Nancy Kass et al., Trust: The Fragile Foundation of Contemporary Biomedical Research, 26 HASTING CTR. REP. 25, 26 (1996).
71
Nat’l Cancer Inst., Clinical Trials Questions and Answers, http://www.cancer.
gov/cancertopics/factsheet/Information/clinical-trials (last visited Sept. 12, 2008).
72
Id.
73
21 C.F.R. § 201.57 (2007).
74
Nat’l Cancer Inst., supra note 71.
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76

law and is subject to Institutional Board Review (IRB) approval.
IRBs perform the initial review of the clinical research program—
including approval of research protocol, informed consent, and advertisements—and oversee the clinical trial in progress to evaluate
77
the on-going degree of risk.
3.

Phase III Testing

Phase III testing attempts “to gather information about effectiveness and safety needed to evaluate the overall benefit-risk relationship of the drug and to provide an adequate basis for physician
78
labeling.” The size of the group is drastically expanded to several
79
hundred or several thousand subjects. Phase III includes both con80
trolled and uncontrolled testing. This means subjects in a Phase III
trial could be subject to two scenarios: a controlled setting, where
there is a possibility of receiving the experimental drug or placebo, or
an uncontrolled setting, where all subjects receive the experimental
81
drug and there is no comparison control group.
While randomized, controlled trials are considered the gold standard in drug
82
evaluation, the allowance of both types of studies permits broader
participation in the trial. Many cancer subjects cite the trial’s design
and use of randomized placebo control groups as the main reason for
83
Similarly to Phase II, subjects
refusal to participate in the study.
84
must meet certain qualifications to participate.
Phase III testing
85
lasts about three years.
75

Institutional Review Boards are required to have at least five members with varying backgrounds and diversity. 45 C.F.R. § 46.107 (2007). To form an adequate
IRB, at least one member must have primary scientific concerns, at least one member
must have primary non-scientific concerns, and at least one member must not be affiliated with the institution. Id. No IRB member may have a conflict of interests in
reviewing a sponsor’s program. Id. In order to gain approval from an IRB, a quorum is needed to vote which includes at least one member whose primary concern is
not in a scientific area. 45 C.F.R. § 46.108 (2007).
76
45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101, 46.109 (2007).
77
45 C.F.R. § 46.109.
78
21 C.F.R. § 312.21(c) (2007).
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
De Deyn & D’Hooge, supra note 62, at 140–42.
82
Katie Featherstone & Jenny L. Donovan, “Why Don’t They Just Tell Me Straight,
Why Allocate It?” The Struggle To Make Sense of Participating in Randomised Controlled Trial, 55 SOC. SCI. & MED. 709, 709 (2002).
83
Priscilla Alderson, Equipoise as a Means of Managing Uncertainty: Personal, Communal and Proxy, 22 J. MED. ETHICS 135, 138 (1996).
84
See supra text accompanying note 72.
85
Rutherford, supra note 49, at 213.
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Post-Phase Testing Procedure

At the completion of all testing phases, the pharmaceutical
company must file the NDA with the FDA for drug marketing ap86
proval. This application must contain reports of the sponsor’s investigations of the drug product and sufficient information about the
drug which the sponsor believes is pertinent to the evaluation of the
87
application. The FDA maintains specific guidance documents on
88
the format and content of the applications. All data and information on safety and effectiveness submitted in an application may be
disclosed to the public upon request unless the FDA finds that ex89
traordinary circumstances exist.
While the FDCA provides the FDA with 180 days to act on the
90
NDA, taking into account delays and informational requests, the
91
FDA averages thirty months to review a NDA. All things considered,
92
the entire drug approval process averages twelve years. Only about
eleven percent of drugs evaluated in Phase I—and only six percent of
cancer drugs—ultimately are approved by the FDA; the others either
93
prove too toxic or do not work. Drug companies pay for the cost of
all clinical trials, and by the time a potential new drug reaches the
market, drug companies claim the product has cost nearly a billion
94
dollars in development. However, pharmaceutical companies’ figures for cost of development have been disputed on the grounds that
their calculations are inflated to justify charging higher prices and
95
that in the end industry profits far exceed the costs of development.
E. Exceptions to Current Approval Procedure
FDA programs for expanded access to medical treatment originated out of the AIDS epidemic in the late 1980s and early 1990s. By
86

21 C.F.R. § 314.50 (2007).
Id.; 21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (2000); see Rutherford, supra note 49, at 213 (noting
that supporting information may contain over 100,000 pages of documentation).
88
21 C.F.R. § 314.50.
89
21 U.S.C. § 355(i)(1).
90
Id. § 355(c)(1).
91
Rutherford, supra note 49, at 213.
92
Id.
93
Okie, supra note 55, at 439.
94
Joseph DiMasi et al., The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug Development
Costs, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 151, 181 (2003).
95
MARCIA ANGELL, THE TRUTH ABOUT DRUG COMPANIES: HOW THEY DECEIVE US
AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 1, 51 (2004). Angell suggests that included in the cost of
research and development are the cost of marketing activities. Id. at 156–172. Compare RICHARD EPSTEIN, OVERDOSE: HOW EXCESSIVE GOVERNMENT REGULATION STIFLES
PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION 1, 165 (Yale Univ. Press 2006).
87
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this time, AIDS had contributed to over 200,000 deaths in the United
States and remained one of the leading causes of death among mid96
dle aged men and women. The gravity and speed of this epidemic,
along with its strong advocacy organizations, pressured the FDA to
expedite access to experimental drugs for what was then a terminal,
97
rather than chronic, disease. The FDA implemented two main policy changes: the compassionate-use programs for investigational new
drugs and the fast-track program.
1.

Compassionate-Use Program

Acknowledging the lengthy timeframe of the drug approval
process, the FDA has created compassionate-use provisions to expe98
dite access to promising new drugs to terminally ill patients who do
99
not qualify for clinical trials. To qualify for the compassionate-use
exception, the following criteria must be met: (1) the drug must be
100
“intended to treat a serious or immediately life-threatening illness”;
(2) there must be “no comparable or satisfactory alternative drug or
other therapy available to treat that stage of the disease in the in101
tended patient population”; (3) the drug must be “under investigation in a controlled clinical trial under an IND in effect for the trial,”
102
or all clinical trials must have been completed; and (4) the sponsor
of the controlled clinical trial must be “actively pursuing marketing
103
approval of the investigational drug.”
Hence, availability of the exception depends on the type of illness and stage of the drug approval
process.
96

Anne Rochell, AIDS Deaths in U.S. Top 200,000, ATLANTA CONSTITUTION, Oct.
29, 1993, at A1; see also Richard Selik et al., HIV Infection as Leading Cause of Death
Among Young Adults in U.S. Cities and States, 270 JAMA 2991, 2992 (1993) (total U.S.
deaths attributable to AIDS is 143,653 in 1990).
97
Philip J. Hilts, How the AIDS Crisis Made Drug Regulators Speed Up, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 24, 1989, at D5.
98
See Jerome Groopman, The Right to Trial; Should Dying Patients Have Access to
Experimental Drugs?, NEW YORKER, Dec. 18, 2006, at 40, 46, for an example of the
compassionate-use provision in practice. The drug Iressa was given to 24,000 lungcancer patients while still an experimental drug after a Phase II trial showed promising results. Id. Unfortunately, Iressa was never approved by the FDA when subjects
failed to show improvements in Phase III clinical trials. Id.
99
21 C.F.R. § 312.34(a) (2008).
100
Id. § 312.34(b)(1)(i).
101
Id. § 312.34(b)(1)(ii); see also Groopman, supra note 98, at 46 (explaining one
instance where a patient was denied use of an experimental brain tumor drug because the patient had refused to undergo radiation therapy which is the standard
treatment for the condition).
102
21 C.F.R. § 312.34(b)(1)(iii).
103
Id. § 312.34(b)(1)(iv).
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Erring on the side of consumer protection, even expedited access is administered conservatively. Drugs will most likely be made
available only in Phase III of the process or if all clinical trials have
104
been completed.
In appropriate and rare circumstances, a drug
may be made available prior to Phase III, but never earlier than postPhase II; however, this allowance is only warranted with an immediate
life-threatening disease when all treatment options have been ex105
The FDA Commissioner retains the discretion to deny a
hausted.
106
request for compassionate-use. This discretion may be employed if
the available scientific evidence fails to show the drug is effective for
its intended use or provides reasonable grounds which indicate the
patient would be exposed to an unreasonable and significant addi107
tional risk of illness.
The law prohibits the drug sponsor from profiting on compassionate-use of experimental drugs, restricting recovery to the cost of
manufacture, research, development, and handling of investigational
108
Thus, pharmaceutical companies have little motivation to
drugs.
comply with drug requests from expanded use programs and many
have refused involvement, fearing that compassionate-use programs
will interfere with clinical trials and ultimately negatively impact drug
109
approval.
2.

Fast-Track Program

The FDA designed the fast-track program to facilitate develop110
ment and expedite review of new drugs for serious illnesses.
To
this end, the program encourages early and ongoing consultation
and communication between the FDA and the drug companies—
both before clinical testing on humans and after Phase I testing—to
111
Under the fast-track proviimprove the efficiency of the process.
sions, the FDA may approve drugs after Phase II if results appear
112
promising. FDA approval is based on the agency making a medical
risk-benefit judgment considering the availability of other therapies
104

Id. § 312.34(a).
Id. § 312.34(a).
106
Id. § 312.34(b)(3)(i)(A)–(B).
107
Id.
108
21 C.F.R. § 312.7(d)(3) (2008).
109
Groopman, supra note 98, at 45–46, 47.
110
Investigational New Drug, Antibiotic, and Biological Drug Product Regulations; Procedures for Drugs Intended to Treat Life-Threatening and Debilitating Illnesses, 53 Fed. Reg. 41,515, 41,516 (1988) (codified at 21 C.F.R. §§ 312, 314).
111
21 C.F.R. § 312.82 (2008).
112
Id. § 312.83.
105
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113

and the severity of the disease.
Finally, if approval is granted, the
FDA may require the sponsor to conduct post-marketing, Phase IV,
studies to evaluate further the drug’s risks, benefits, and optimal
114
uses.
As a result of the fast-track program, the drug zidovudine, AZT,
was the first drug approved to treat the AIDS virus, and in record
115
time. Approval of treatment protocol took five days and marketing
approval post-Phase II took only 107 days due to well-controlled and
116
well-executed clinical trials.
The total drug approval time was
117
Additionally, under the
shortened from eight years to two years.
compassionate-use program, AZT, during its development, was distributed to more than 4000 patients while the marketing application
118
was being pulled together by the sponsor and reviewed by the FDA.
Despite this success, the reaction to promoting early and wider
access to experimental drugs was mixed, especially within the AIDS
community. Some researchers feared that earlier availability of
drugs, without full testing on safety and efficacy, was risky and detri119
The pharmaceutical
mental to patients and the pursuit of a cure.
companies were equally unenthusiastic about the expanded use programs, arguing that drugs needed to be further tested before apply120
Following the first year of the program, the exing for an IND.
panded access programs were labeled a “failure” and a “sham” for
their inability to facilitate any potential drugs to attack AIDS di121
rectly. Only one sponsor had applied for and received approval for
122
Even though physicians
a treatment IND for a HIV-related drug.
113

Investigational New Drug, Antibiotic, and Biological Drug Product Regulations; Procedures for Drugs Intended to Treat Life-Threatening and Debilitating Illnesses, 53 Fed. Reg. at 41,523; 21 C.F.R. § 312.84.
114
Investigational New Drug, Antibiotic, and Biological Drug Product Regulations; Procedures for Drugs Intended to Treat Life-Threatening and Debilitating Illnesses, 53 Fed. Reg. at 41,517; 21 C.F.R. § 312.85.
115
Investigational New Drug, Antibiotic, and Biological Drug Product Regulations; Procedures for Drugs Intended to Treat Life-Threatening and Debilitating Illnesses, 53 Fed. Reg. at 41,519.
116
Id.
117
Id.
118
Id. at 41,520.
119
Hilts, supra note 97, at D5.
120
Philip Boffey, New Initiative to Speed AIDS Drugs Is Assailed, N.Y. TIMES, July 5,
1988, at C1.
121
PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N ON THE HUMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCY VIRUS EPIDEMIC,
REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE HUMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCY VIRUS
EPIDEMIC 50 (1988) [hereinafter PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N REPORT]; Boffey, supra note
120, at C1.
122
PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N REPORT, supra note 121, at 50.
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and the terminally ill sought medication, pharmaceutical companies
123
hesitated to release their drugs. Drug companies’ lack of participation in the programs stemmed from their concern about disruptions
in their clinical trials, as well as fear of increased susceptibility to li124
ability suits.
III. ABIGAIL ALLIANCE FOR BETTER ACCESS TO DEVELOPMENT DRUGS V.
VON ESCHENBACH
A. Formation of Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Development
Drugs
Alliance is a non-profit organization consisting of terminally ill
patients and their supporters whose main mission is to “help cancer
125
patients and others with life threatening illnesses.”
Frank Burroughs founded Alliance in 2001, naming the foundation after his
126
daughter, Abigail, who lost her life to terminal cancer. Prior to her
death, Abigail had exhausted all of the FDA-approved treatment op127
Her physician was encouraged by a new unaptions available.
proved drug which he believed showed a good response in early clin128
ical trials, and he recommended experimenting with such usage.
Abigail did not qualify for the clinical trials of the new drug, and the
drug company could not provide her with the drug through the
129
In her memory, Alliance has sought
compassionate-use program.
to assist terminally ill patients in gaining access to experimental drugs
before efficacy has been shown in clinical trials by lobbying for con123

Id.
Boffey, supra note 119, at C1.
125
Abigail Alliance for Access to Development Drugs, The Abigail Alliance Mission, http://abigail-alliance.org/mission.htm (last visited Sept. 12, 2008).
126
Sue Kovach, The Abigail Alliance: Motivated by Tragic Circumstances, Families Battle
an Uncaring Bureaucracy, LIFE EXTENSION, Sept. 2007, at 25, available at http://
abigail-alliance.org/LEMSEP07pAbigailLR.pdf.
127
Id.
128
Id. at 26.
129
Id. Abigail Burroughs was seeking access to the drug Erbitux, manufactured by
ImClone Systems. Id. ImClone filed their original request for approval at the FDA in
2001; however, the FDA determined that the application could not be reviewed since
the clinical data was inadequate: “half of the patients studied had not failed the approved treatments for colon cancer and important information about safety and effectiveness of Erbitux in a portion of the remaining patients was missing.” Press Release, FDA, FDA Approves Erbitux for Colorectal Cancer (Feb. 12, 2004) (available at
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/NEWS/2004/NEW01024.html). In 2003, ImClone
resubmitted results from a well-run trial and supplemented missing information
from their original 2001 request. Id. The FDA approved Erbitux on February 12,
2004. Id.
124
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gressional change, protesting the FDA, encouraging cooperation with
drug companies, and educating the public on the need to increase
130
access to potential life-saving drugs.
1.

Procedural History

In furtherance of its mission, Alliance submitted a proposal to
the FDA in January 2003 for new regulations that would make experimental drugs available after Phase I trials to terminally ill patients
131
In so doing, Alliance atwho were not selected for clinical trials.
tempted to expand the FDA’s extant compassionate-use program that
allows investigational drugs to be accessed after Phase III, and with
132
The FDA rejected Alliance’s petisome exceptions, after Phase II.
tion, concluding that the proposal would upset the appropriate bal133
ance the FDA sought to maintain.
The FDA noted that “in the
realm of reviewing medical products to treat serious and lifethreatening diseases, there is inevitable tension between early availability of products to patients, especially patients with refractory dis134
ease, and the need to obtain sufficient data to provide a reasonable
135
Accordingly,
expectation of benefit and lack of excessive harm.”
the FDA concluded that increasing patient availability before a risk136
benefit analysis could be performed would be detrimental.
Such a response was unsurprising considering the context in
which the FDA reviewed Alliance’s proposal. In 2003, product liability lawsuits were filed against Merck because of the dangerous sideeffects of the drug Vioxx, subjecting the FDA to enormous criticism
137
The FDA approved
for allowing an unsafe product to the market.
Vioxx in 1999 for treatment of pain and inflammation associated with
138
arthritis. However, after being on the market for a few years, Vioxx

130

Kovach, supra note 126, at 29.
Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. McClellan, No.
03-1601, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29594, at **3–4 (D.D.C. Aug. 30, 2004).
132
See supra notes 89–96.
133
Abigail Alliance, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29594, at *4.
134
A refractory disease is defined as a disease which is obstinate or not readily
yielding to treatment. STEDMAN’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1542 (28th ed. 2005).
135
Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von Eschenbach,
445 F.3d 470, 490 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
136
Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von Eschenbach,
495 F.3d 695, 700 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
137
Alex Berenson, Merck Asks for a Dismissal in First of Suits over Vioxx, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 13, 2005, at C5; Walter T. Champion, The Vioxx Litigation Paradigm: The Search for
Smoking Guns, 31 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 157, 167, 173 (2006).
138
Champion, supra note 137, at 158, 163–64.
131
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was shown to cause adverse cardiovascular side effects.
While
Merck pulled Vioxx from distribution in 2004, skepticism increased
as to how such a dangerous drug could reach the market, leaving
140
Ironiquestions about the state and effectiveness of clinical trials.
cally, Alliance’s timing for promoting early access to experimental
drugs coincided with a movement that focused on promoting the
safety of drugs over increasing the speed by which drugs entered the
market.
It was against this background that Alliance filed a citizen peti141
tion, pursuant to 21 C.F.R. § 10.30, challenging the FDA’s policy
prohibiting the distribution of experimental drugs to terminally ill
142
patients.
The FDA acknowledged but did not respond to the peti143
Consetion, which allowed Alliance the right to judicial review.
quently, Alliance filed suit against the FDA Commissioner and the
Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services to enjoin
the FDA from forbidding the sale and distribution of post–Phase I
144
The U.S. District Court for the District of Coexperimental drugs.
lumbia dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim because
Alliance was seeking to establish a new constitutional right to life not
145
The court acknowlexplicitly granted in the due process clause.
edged the nation’s focus on preserving life but did not accept Alliance’s argument that the Supreme Court’s recognition of the right to
146
created a “complementary
refuse life-saving medical treatment
147
right to choose life by obtaining potentially life-saving medication.”
Without an established fundamental due process right, the court examined Alliance’s claims under rational basis review and held that
the FDA’s policy on restricting access to unapproved drugs is ration-

139

Id. at 164.
Id. at 166–67.
141
A Citizen Petition is a means for interested parties to initiate administrative
proceedings in order to petition the Commissioner of the FDA to issue, amend, or
revoke a regulation or refrain from taking a certain action. 21 C.F.R. § 10.25(a)
(2008). The format and contents of the petition are governed the rules set out in 21
C.F.R. § 10.30 (2008). The Commissioner of the FDA has the authority to grant or
deny petitions and must respond to each petitioner within 180 days of receipt. Id. §
10.30(e)(1)–(3).
142
Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von Eschenbach,
445 F.3d 470, 473 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
143
Id.
144
Id. at 473–74.
145
Id. at 474.
146
See Cruzan v. Dir. Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (upholding
the legal principle that individuals have a right to refuse medical treatment).
147
Abigail Alliance, 445 F.3d at 474–75.
140
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ally related to the legitimate governmental interest of protecting pub148
lic health.
Alliance appealed this dismissal and in May 2006 the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the motion
149
to dismiss de novo. On appeal, the issue was whether fundamental
due process rights to privacy, liberty, and life include the right of
terminally ill patients who are informed and acting on their doctor’s
advice to obtain potentially life-saving, unapproved drugs when no
150
alternative exists.
In a two-to-one decision, the court overturned
the district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim, holding that
due process protects the rights of terminally ill patients to have access
151
In arriving at this decision,
to post–Phase I investigational drugs.
the court based its analysis on whether such a right was part of our
nation’s “history and legal tradition” and “implicit in the concept of
152
liberty.”
The court created a careful and narrow description of the fundamental right: “the right of terminally ill patients, acting on a doctor’s advice, to obtain potentially life-saving medication when no al153
ternative treatment approved by the government is available.” The
court looked to three common law doctrines to show a right to selfpreservation in our nation’s history and legal tradition—the doctrine
of necessity, the tort of intentional interference with rescue, and the
154
right to self-defense. The court recognized in Anglo-American history a tradition that “when a person is faced with death, necessity of155
ten warrants extraordinary measures not otherwise justified.” Denying patients access to life-saving drugs, then, would violate this right
156
of self-preservation. Additionally, the court examined the history of
drug regulation, concluding that regulating access to new drugs was
157
recent in our nation’s history.
The court supported its position of
allowing access by stating that restricting access was not part of America’s tradition, since drugs were not regulated until 1906 and it was

148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157

Id. at 475.
Id.
Id. at 477–78.
Id. at 486.
Id. at 476–77.
Abigail Alliance, 445 F.3d at 478.
Id. at 480–81.
Id. at 480.
Id.
Id. at 481.
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not until 1962 that access to new drugs required a showing of effi158
cacy.
The court not only found the right to experimental drugs established in our nation’s history and legal tradition but concluded that
159
The
such a right was “‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’”
court held that the right to access unapproved drugs was implied in
the Court’s decision in Cruzan v. Missouri Department of Health, which
held that the due process clause protects a person’s right to refuse
160
life-saving medical treatment.
The court noted that this holding
created a due process right to “make an informed decision to engage
161
in conduct, by withdrawing treatment, that will cause one’s death.”
Applying the due process rights established in Cruzan to Alliance’s
case, the court found that the “logical corollary is that an individual
must also be free to decide for herself whether to assume any known
or unknown risks of taking a medication that might prolong her
162
life.”
The court remanded the case to the district court to deter163
mine whether the FDA’s policy would pass strict scrutiny.
On March 1, 2007, the FDA appealed the decision of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia and the court agreed to
164
hear the case en banc.
By August 2007, the court of appeals vacated its prior decision in an eight-to-two vote concluding “that there
is no fundamental right ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and
165
tradition’ of access to experimental drugs for the terminally ill.” In
order for Alliance to succeed on its claim, the court found it needed
to show that there was both a tradition of access to drugs that have
not been proven effective and a tradition of access to drugs that have
166
It was not adequate only to show that the
not been proven safe.
government did not have a long history of regulating drugs in a gen167
eral sense.
In its analysis, the court examined the history of drug
regulation since 1736 and concluded that Alliance had ignored the
nation’s history of drug safety regulation prior to governmental acts
158

Id. at 481–82.
Abigail Alliance, 445 F.3d at 483–84 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S.
319, 325 (1937)).
160
Id. at 484.
161
Id.
162
Id.
163
Id. at 486.
164
Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von Eschenbach,
495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
165
Id. at 697 (quoting Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977)).
166
Id. at 703.
167
Id.
159
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168

for drug regulation.
While the court conceded that a lack of governmental interference throughout history may be some evidence
that a right is deeply rooted, the court noted that this lack of regula169
tion was insufficient on its own.
Furthermore, the court rejected Alliance’s reliance on the three
170
common law doctrines of self-preservation.
The court noted that
Alliance offered little detail about how the common law doctrine of
171
Rather, the court acknowledged that
necessity applied to its case.
the Supreme Court’s analysis of this doctrine in Oakland Cannabis
172
Buyer’s Co-op left almost no leeway for the doctrine of necessity to
173
override the FDCA. In Oakland Cannabis Buyer’s Co-op, the Supreme
Court rejected an argument that medical necessity could be read into
a statute which explicitly denied access to drugs, holding that the defense of necessity is invalid if Congress has statutorily limited its ap174
plication.
In Abigail Alliance, Congress, through the FDCA, limited
access to experimental drugs; consequently, the common law doctrine of necessity could not override the legislature’s value judg175
Additionally, the court abandoned the argument based on
ment.
the tort of intentional interference with life-saving efforts, stating that
such an action requires that aid be given to a person that is necessary
176
There is no application of
to secure that person’s bodily integrity.
this principle to Alliance’s case because the drugs have not been
177
proven to be safe or effective so as to be necessary to save one’s life.
Lastly, the court rejected Alliance’s self-defense argument by refusing
to accept that this case was about using reasonable force to defend
178
oneself or about receiving access to medical treatment. The court’s
decision turned on the fact that Alliance’s patients could not “defend” themselves from harm by taking life-saving drugs with only the

168

Id. at 704•05.
Id. at 706.
170
Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 707–10.
171
Id. at 707–08.
172
United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyer’s Co-op, 532 U.S. 483 (2001) (discussing the legality of providing marijuana to patients in violation of the Controlled
Substance Act).
173
Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 708 (noting that in Oakland the Supreme Court
held that Congress may limit or even eliminate a necessity defense that would under
normal circumstances be available).
174
Id.
175
Id.
176
Id.
177
Id. at 710.
178
Id.
169

OCHS (FINAL)

580

4/6/2009 11:21:59 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:559

179

potential for therapeutic effect.
The court found that Alliance was
not arguing for the right of patients to defend themselves against a
180
disease or harm, but only for the right to assume an enormous risk.
The court found no fundamental right to access experimental
drugs; hence, it applied a rational basis review to the government’s
181
regulations.
It was evident to the court that the government had a
rational basis for guaranteeing “a scientifically and medically acceptable level of knowledge about the risks and benefits of such a drug;
the FDA’s policy of limiting access to investigational drugs is rationally related to the legitimate state interest of protecting patients, including the terminally ill, from potentially unsafe drugs with un182
known therapeutic effects.”
While the August 2007 decision of the court of appeals was a
roadblock for Alliance’s effort, the group subsequently filed a peti183
tion for a writ of certiorari at the Supreme Court. Even though certiorari was denied in early 2008, Alliance remains firmly committed to
its cause, decreeing that the organization will continue to pursue the
right to access investigational drugs in other federal circuit courts of
184
appeal and, if necessary, in Congress.
IV. AN EXERCISE IN FUTILITY: PHARMACEUTICAL
COMPANIES LACK INCENTIVES TO VOLUNTARILY PROVIDE ACCESS TO
INVESTIGATIONAL DRUGS.
Even with a favorable verdict, Alliance will not be successful in
accomplishing access to post–Phase I experimental drugs through litigation. Pharmaceutical companies are private corporations, not
185
state actors. So, while the Constitution may require the removal of
179

Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 710.
Id. at 710.
181
Id. at 713.
182
Id.
183
Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von Eschenbach,
495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc), petition for cert. filed, 76 U.S.L.W. 3373 (U.S.
Sept. 28, 2008) (No. 07-444).
184
Press Release, Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs, Abigail Alliance Will Appeal D.C. Circuit Court Decision (Aug. 22, 2007) (on file with
author).
185
A state actor is a person or entity acting on behalf of the government and is
therefore subject to the U.S. Bill of Rights. Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S.
922, 929–30 (1982). The Constitution does not grant affirmative rights but only protects individuals from the government infringing on constitutional rights not private
individuals. Deshaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 489 U.S. 189, 195
(1989). Private individual entities have been converted to state actors when there is a
close nexus between the government and the private sector, when the government
180
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a government-imposed barrier such as a federal regulation to drug
access, such a decision does not compel a private pharmaceutical
company to grant such access, absent some statute. Thus, success in
removing the legal barrier is only the first, albeit necessary step, and
will not conclude the fight—Alliance will then have to convince drug
companies to actually release the drugs or obtain passage of legislation commanding access. Such an outcome is unlikely. When the
cost, practical infeasibilities, potential tort claim liability, ethical hurdles, and lack of infrastructure for such a program are considered,
pharmaceutical companies are unlikely to provide experimental
drugs unless drastic changes and accommodations are provided to
protect them.
A. Access to Experimental Drugs Is Practically Infeasible
Assuming arguendo that drug manufacturers could voluntarily
provide access to experimental drugs, they currently lack incentive to
do so. The dynamics of the drug approval and development process
make providing drugs early in the testing state practically infeasible.
The main factors that control the incentives for providing access to
these drugs are the fear of tort litigation, threat to clinical trials, limits to manufacturing capacity, possibility of harmful—or even deadly—effects of the drugs, and the lack of financial benefit.
1.

Fear of Increased Tort Litigation

Every drug manufacturer has an ever-present concern for the
possibility of tort litigation even after a new drug has been approved
186
and has been on the market.
With unapproved, experimental
drugs, the uncertainty of the drug’s safety and effectiveness along
with the possibility of unknown side effects creates a legitimate fear
for manufacturers. Informed consent claims are the routine type of
187
However,
litigation that occurs with regard to unapproved drugs.
even these claims can be coupled with additional allegations under
theories of strict product liability, failure to warn, negligence, and
coerces, controls or encourages a private actor, when the action the private actor
performs is traditionally a government function, or when the government and private actor participate in joint activity. See generally Lugar, 457 U.S. 922; Rendell-Baker
v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715
(1961); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
186
See Barnaby J. Feder, Federal Panel Consolidates Vioxx Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17,
2005, at C1, for an example of volume and cost of tort litigation when issues of safety
and effectiveness arise with an approved medication such as Vioxx.
187
Michelle M. Mello et al., The Rise of Litigation in Human Subjects Research, 139
ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 40, 41 (2003).

OCHS (FINAL)

582

4/6/2009 11:21:59 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:559

188

fraud.
The implications of such litigation are obvious and severe:
the cost of research and development will drastically increase and
drug companies will have a disincentive to produce new cancer
189
drugs.
a.

Informed Consent

Informed consent represents a crucial safeguard protecting hu190
man subjects participating in clinical trials for unapproved drugs.
All clinical trial investigators are required to obtain the consent of
participants after providing a sufficient opportunity for considera191
Information provided to the participant is required to be in
tion.
clear, comprehendible language, and consent must contain both “a
description of any reasonably foreseeable risks or discomforts” and a
description of benefits to the subject which may reasonably be ex192
Additionally, investigators must provide a statement of the
pected.
purpose and expectation of the study and a description of the trial
procedures; for instance, whether the trial is a blind, randomized tri193
al. These particular facts are crucial to participants’ understanding
that the study is not medical treatment but an experimental study.
No informed consent may include any exculpatory language which
waives or appears to release the sponsor from any liability for negli194
gence. Ultimately, informed consent seeks to ensure that each subject is competent to understand the information provided and willing
to accept participation in investigational studies voluntarily without
195
any undue influences.
While its aim is to protect subjects in clinical trials, informed
consent fails to be effective when a subject’s understanding of his access to the experimental drug is tainted by therapeutic misconcep196
tion.
Therapeutic misconception occurs when a subject regardless
of the information provided concerning the study nonetheless be-

188

Id.
Id. at 44.
190
See 21 C.F.R. § 50 (2007).
191
Id. § 50.20.
192
Id. § 50.20, 50.25(a).
193
Id. § 50.25(a).
194
Id. § 50.20.
195
Sarah Hewlett, Consent to Clinical Research—Adequately Voluntary or Substantially
Influenced?, 22 J. MED. ETHICS 232, 232 (1996).
196
Paul S. Applebaum et al., False Hopes and Best Data: Consent to Research and the
Therapeutic Misconception, 17 HASTINGS CTR. REPORT. 20, 20 (1987).
189
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lieves that the research project will benefit him directly.
A key factor in informed consent for subjects is the understanding that consent to use experimental drugs in a clinical setting is not the same as
198
Subjects under this misapprehension deny the possibiltreatment.
ity that there could be any disadvantages to participating in a study
199
Research shows that as many as seventy
on experimental drugs.
percent of subjects in clinical trials suffer from therapeutic misconception, believing that their participation is medical treatment for
200
Such a high percentage among subjects is
their personal needs.
substantiated when participants are questioned regarding their motivation for entering clinical trials. Instead of indicating a desire to assist in research for the good of cancer patients as a whole, most subjects indicate their participation in a trial was based on a desire to get
advanced medical treatment, the hope of possibly benefiting in the
absence of alternatives, and blind trust in their doctors’ recommen201
dation.
With this mindset, subjects do not pay particular heed to
202
the information provided through the informed consent process.
In fact, many participants decide to participate in a clinical trial before even learning about the design of the study or signing the
203
form.
This misalignment of investigators’ goals and participants’ expectations regarding involvement in clinical trials creates a ripe setting for litigation. A current example of an informed consent claim
derived from therapeutic misconception is the lawsuit sparked by the
204
In September 1999, eighteen-year-old
death of Jesse Gelsinger.
Jesse Gelsinger died from a reaction to a Phase I gene therapy treatment at the University of Pennsylvania’s Institute of Human Gene
205
Gelsinger suffered from a rare genetic illness which seriTherapy.
206
While his illness had left him hospitalized
ously affected his liver.
197

Paul S. Applebaum, Clarifying the Ethics of Clinical Research: A Path toward Avoiding the Therapeutic Misconception, 2 AM. J. BIOETHICS 22, 22–23 (2002).
198
Gail E. Henderson et al., Clinical Trials and Medical Care: Defining the Therapeutic
Misconception, 4 PLOSMED. 1735, 1735 (2007), available at http://medicine.plos
journals.org/perlserv/?request=get-document&doi=10.1371/journal.pmed.0040324.
199
Applebaum, supra note 197, at 22.
200
Id. at 23.
201
Kass et al., supra note 70, at 25–26.
202
Id.
203
Id.
204
Mello et al., supra note 187, at 41.
205
Larry Thompson, Human Gene Therapy: Harsh Lessons, High Hopes, FDA
CONSUMER, Sept.–Oct. 2000, available at http://www.fda.gov/fdac/features/2000/
500_gene.html.
206
Id.
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and seriously ill for many years, Gelsinger had been able to control
207
his disease with diet and pills and lived as a normal, active teenager.
Although Gelsinger was considered healthy, Gelsinger’s father encouraged him to participate in a Phase I study hoping there would be
208
therapeutic benefit from the new therapy. Four days after receiving
the experimental treatment, Gelsinger died, but not from his dis209
ease—the experimental therapy caused multiple system failure.
Despite signing the informed consent form, the Gelsinger family, after Jesse’s death, pursued an action with claims of informed consent,
210
product liability, and fraud. The Gelsingers claimed that the investigators failed to reveal information regarding the risks of the trial
and that the principal investigator had a financial conflict of interest
211
In the end, both parties reached a confidential
with the sponsor.
212
settlement agreement in November 2000.
The Gelsingers’ lawsuit illustrates the possible issues created with
informed consent and therapeutic misconception. Participants who
refuse to understand the fundamental risk of experimental studies
are left disappointed, angry, and confused when the trials do not
produce an expected health benefit. This expectation, although unrealistic, has the potential to expose drug sponsors to increased tort
litigation regardless of informed consent.
b.

Application of Informed Consent to Alliance

The threat of informed consent litigation discourages pharmaceutical companies from allowing open access to experimental drugs.
Even though Alliance’s patients would not be clinical trial subjects,
these patients would still be required to give informed consent for
use of experimental drugs. Considering the novelty of providing investigational drugs outside of the clinical trial context, the dynamics
of informed consent in clinical trials provides the best guide to assess
how informed consent may or may not work in countering tort litiga-

207

Id.
Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Teenager’s Death Is Shaking Up Field of Human Gene-Therapy
Experiments, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2000, at A20.
209
Thompson, supra note 205.
210
Mello et al., supra note 187, at 41. It is important to note that the Gelsinger
family’s addition of a fraud claim exposed the pharmaceutical company to the possibility of increased damage awards. Id. Punitive damages occur in less than 1.5% of
medical malpractice verdicts and approximately five percent of plaintiff trial wins
overall. Id. at 42. However, punitive damage awards are exceptionally common
among fraud claims, occurring in about one-fourth of verdicts for plaintiff. Id.
211
Id.
212
Id.
208
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tion and setting proper expectations for Alliance’s members. Clinical
trial participants are a logical corollary to Alliance’s members because
the patients are voluntary and there will necessarily be limited knowledge about the drugs. Hence, one issue that arises is whether post–
Phase I informed consent can ever even be given. With limited knowledge about the side-effects and possibly no information about effectiveness, the quantity and quality of information provided might not
afford realistic or adequate expectations for the patient to make a
proper decision to use the experimental drugs.
Therapeutic misconception may eliminate a patient’s ability to
make a knowing and voluntary decision to use investigational drugs
even if there is informed consent. Similar to clinical trials, subjects
receiving access to experimental medications are not receiving treatment. While they will not be exposed to the implications of blind,
randomized studies, patients will still be receiving drugs which have
not been proven effective, whose dosage has not been perfected, and
whose side-effects are unknown. In a sense, while not officially participating in a trial, the patients are still “test rats” for the investigational drug. Studies of clinical trials have shown that patients who
suffer from terminal illness are more likely to view taking experimental drugs as treatment and less likely to weigh all risks, benefits, and
213
Since Alliance represents terminally ill patients who
alternatives.
have exhausted their options, therapeutic misconception would most
likely be a factor affecting the validity of its patients’ informed consent and could lead to a “Gelsinger” situation where patients bring
litigation when their expectation of the “treatment” is not satisfied or
something tragic happens.
The possibility of informed consent claims surrounding access to
experimental drugs provides a disincentive for pharmaceutical companies to allow access to unproven drugs. Pharmaceutical companies
will be afforded very little protection from informed consent forms
and will be left vulnerable to liability. Regardless of the validity of
possible litigation, defending any actions translates into money lost.
This increased cost to research and development could deter drug
companies either from providing access or, even worse, from pursuing cancer drugs at all.

213

Monica H. Schaeffer et al., The Impact of Disease Severity on the Informed Consent
Process in Clinical Research, 100 AM. J. MED. 261, 267 (1996).
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Access to Experimental Drugs Could Hinder New Drug
Development

Phase I access to experimental drugs creates a major concern for
its effects on new drug development as a whole. The general fear is
that accessing experimental drugs will have an impact and influence
on the success of clinical trials. Clinical trials—the essential backbone of getting safe and effective new drugs to market—could be
jeopardized with widened access as studies struggle for human subject
recruitment. Currently, there is already a shortage of available and
qualified subjects who may and are willing to participate in trials: only
three percent of cancer patients in the United States are enrolled in
214
clinical trials.
As discussed, a motivating factor in participation for
these trials is the ability to access the drugs before they become avail215
able to the general public.
If available, patients will most likely
choose access to drugs outside of the clinical study in order to avoid
the possibility of receiving a placebo in a double-blind, randomized
216
Additionally, if patients can access these drugs locally from
trial.
their doctor, patients will have less incentive to travel to centers to
217
A shortage of patients willing to participate in
participate in trials.
studies could further extend the time and resources needed to com218
plete pre-market studies.
Many cancer organizations, such as the
219
National Coalition for Cancer Survivorship and the National Breast
220
Cancer Coalition, have been unwilling to support Alliance’s efforts,
214

Groopman, supra note 98, at 47.
Kass et al., supra note 70, at 25–26.
216
Kerry Howley, Dying for Lifesaving Drugs: Will Desperate Patients Destroy the Pharmaceutical System That Produces Tomorrow’s Treatments?, REASON, Aug. 1, 2007, at 25,
available at http://www.reason.com/news/show/120763.html.
217
Id.
218
Okie, supra note 55, at 437.
219
The National Coalition for Cancer Survivorship (NCCS) is the oldest survivorled cancer advocacy organization in the country, founded in 1986. NCCS, About
NCCS, http://www.canceradvocacy.org/about (last visited Sept. 2, 2008). NCCS advocates for cancer care and cancer survivors, making its main priority patient education. Id. “NCCS believes in evidence-based advocacy for systemic changes at the federal level in how the nation researches, regulates, finances and delivers quality
cancer care.” Id.
220
The National Breast Cancer Coalition (NBCC) is a nationwide advocacy network consisting of 600 member organizations and 70,000 individual breast cancer
activists. National Breast Cancer Coalition, NBCC History, http://www.natlbcc.org/
index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=45 (last visited Sept. 2, 2008).
Founded in 1991, the NBCC’s goal is to eradicate breast cancer through promoting
research and improving access to quality treatment and care. Id. Considered one of
the most influential groups in health policy, NBCC continues to advocate for change
in public policy, science, and industry “by creating new partnerships, collaborations,
research funding opportunities and avenues for access to quality care.” Id.
215
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fearing widening access will undermine these critical clinical studies
221
and interfere with the progression of cancer research.
Hesitation on the part of pharmaceutical companies to volunteer access to new drugs may also be valid; there is the possibility that
complications or issues which arise with terminally ill users could later be used against the drug companies in evaluating or halting the
222
Physicians will bear the burden of prescribapproval by the FDA.
ing these experimental drugs and attempting to administer the proper dosage and program based on the limited knowledge of risks, con223
traindications, and benefits. Since these experimental drugs would
not be administered in a controlled or regulated environment, any
224
outcomes, either beneficial or tragic, could be misleading.
Apprehension arises when patients with different cancers start taking experimental drugs outside of the clinic trial context; researchers will
be unable to determine which drugs work for which cancers and be
225
unable to account for any outcomes—whether positive or negative.
Public sentiment to adverse reactions of drugs outside the clinical environment could unfairly interfere with the results of a clinical trial,
possibly forcing the FDA to get involved in the investigation before
submission of a NDA.
Overall, any possibility of prolonging or interfering with the
drug approval process strongly eliminates incentives for pharmaceutical companies to continue with research and development of new
drugs. Taking into consideration the rate of approval, costs, and the
degree of risk, the market for cancer drugs is not as lucrative as it ap226
pears. With only a few real blockbuster drugs for cancer treatment,
drug companies, when faced with a business decision between devel221

See Press Release, National Coalition for Cancer Survivorship, Physician and
Patient Care Groups Join (Feb. 6, 2007), available at http://www.canceradvocacy.org
/news/press/2007/physician-and-patient-care.html; National Breast Cancer Coalition, Alliance’s Petition to the FDA, http://www.stopbreastcancer.org/index.
php?option=com_content&task=view&id=76&Itemid=180 (last visited Sept. 8, 2008).
222
Howley, supra note 216, at 6.
223
Peter D. Jacobson & Wendy E. Parmet, A New Era of Unapproved Drugs: The Case
of Abigail Alliance v. Von Eschenbach, 297 JAMA 205, 207 (2007).
224
Compassionate Use of Investigational New Drugs: Is the Current Process Effective?:
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Gov’t Reform, 107th Cong. 102 (2001) (Statement by Dr.
Robert J. Temple, Associate Director of Medical Policy at the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research) [hereinafter Compassionate Use Hearing] (stating that industry
concerns raised at the Oncology Drugs Advisory Committee meeting for access to
experimental drugs were that the “use of an investigational drug in less controlled
setting, in patients with very advanced disease could lead to adverse reactions that
might raise difficult to resolve but spurious safety concerns about the drug”).
225
Groopman, supra note 98, at 46–47.
226
Id.
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oping a high-risk cancer drug or a new drug for cholesterol, for example, may choose to take a conservative approach and accept a fair
227
This dilemma
rate of return by developing the cholesterol drug.
will only be further aggravated if access to experimental drugs interferes with the clinical trials or it becomes difficult to identify which
drugs are effective. There is considerable risk for cancer patients that
there will be a “shift [in] investment from oncology to other areas
where the development process is well defined and much less
228
If the cancer drug approval process becomes too laborious,
risky.”
companies may abandon cancer research all together.
3.

Lack of Financial Incentive

The cost of development and production of new drugs can be
229
astronomical for pharmaceutical companies.
The market for these
drugs in Phase I will consist strictly of a subset of all terminally ill can230
cer patients, which is estimated at about 565,650 patients a year.
The challenge for pharmaceutical companies is to adequately price
these new drugs to a fairly limited market so that using the drug is
231
Most likely, Medicare,
feasible for the manufacturer and patient.
Medicaid, and private insurers will not pay for experimental post–
232
Phase I drugs. Health insurers are willing to pay for treatments that
are proven safe, effective, and medically necessary, but deny interven233
tion coverage for emerging therapies.
Hence, Medicaid and private health insurance companies customarily include in their policies provisions providing for the denial
of “experimental” treatment, a term that has varying definitions and
234
interpretations. The possible ambiguity in the term “experimental”
has led to recent litigation between insurers and women suffering
from breast cancer seeking coverage for the “investigational” autolo235
gous bone marrow transplant (ABMT) treatment, which had only
227

Id.
Id.
229
See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
230
See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
231
Groopman, supra note 98, at 46–47.
232
Okie, supra note 55, at 440.
233
John Cova, A Swift Response to a “Modest” Proposal, 84 J. NAT’L CANCER INST. 744,
744 (1992) (noting that insurers are not responsible for funding clinical research).
234
Angela Holder, Funding Innovative Medical Treatment, 57 ALB. L. REV. 795, 795–
96 (1994).
235
ABMT is an aggressive procedure to treat State IV cancer by which bone marrow is extracted from the patient and frozen while the patient undergoes unusually
high doses of chemotherapy. Pirozzi v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Va., 741 F. Supp.
586, 588 (E.D. Va. 1990). When the chemotherapy is complete, the bone marrow is
228
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236

been through Phase II testing.
Applying contract law, many courts
have construed the ambiguity of policy language against the insurer
and many women were successful in receiving coverage for this intervention because courts deemed it to be potentially life-saving medical
237
treatment. Nonetheless, many courts have sided with the insurance
company’s denial of ABMT treatment because the intervention quali238
fied as experimental and the policy language was clear. Most likely,
as a result of this litigation, insurance companies will have removed
all ambiguities in coverage in regards to “experimental” drugs. Even
if such ambiguity still exists, courts will potentially be less likely to side
in favor of a patient when the drug has only been through Phase I
trials in contrast to ABMT which had completed Phase II. Additionally, the subsequent FDA denial of Phase III approval of the ABMT
239
procedure established a strong warning for the courts that drugs
which have not properly finished testing are still experimental and
can fail for lack of efficacy. Considering this progression, it is likely
that the terminally ill will be forced to pay out of pocket for the expenses of these investigational drugs.
In addition to a lack of insurance coverage to compensate for
drug use, if the pharmaceutical companies find it necessary to track
and monitor these experimental drugs, the additional costs—above
research and development and clinical trials—might be too high to
240
In its complaint, Alliance armake providing access worthwhile.
gued that the experimental drugs should be able to be sold at a profit
by the pharmaceutical companies in order to encourage participa-

restored in the patient. Id. This treatment requires at least a ten-day hospital stay
and follow-up medical care costing on average $100,000. Id. At the time of the litigation, ABMT had not been tested in a Phase III study. Id.
236
See infra notes 237–38.
237
See, e.g., Adams v. Blue Cross / Blue Shield of Md., Inc., 757 F. Supp. 661, 663
(D. Md. 1991); Bucci v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Conn., 764 F. Supp. 728, 731 (D.
Conn. 1991); Pirozzi, 741 F. Supp. at 595; Taylor v. Blue Cross / Blue Shield of Mich.,
517 N.W.2d 864, 867–69 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994); Waldrip v. Conn. Nat’l Life Ins. Co.,
566 So. 2d 434, 437 (La. App. 1990).
238
See, e.g., Harris v. Mutual of Omaha Cos., 992 F.2d 706, 712–13 (7th Cir. 1993);
Holder v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 951 F.2d 89, 90–92 (5th Cir. 1992); Hasty v.
Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Health & Welfare Fund, 851 F. Supp. 1250, 1255–60
(N.D. Ind. 1994).
239
For a discussion on why ABMT subsequently failed to prove effective in randomized clinical trials after over 30,000 women had unnecessarily received this drastic treatment, see The Breast Cancer HDCT / Transplant Debacle: Why Did It Happen, and
Could It Happen Again, 16 ONCOLOGY NEWS INT’L, Sept. 2007, available at http://www.
cancernetwork.com/showArticle.jhtml?articleId=201805399.
240
Okie, supra note 55, at 440.
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241

tion.
This change would be in direct opposition to the FDA’s current regulations regarding “compassionate-use” exceptions that strictly prohibit the companies from making a profit on investigational
242
This departure from the current standard embodies Allidrugs.
ance’s belief, and the libertarian perspective, that the terminally ill
have the right to autonomy, to make personal self-dealing choices
about their lives and their medical treatment—including whether to
243
pay out-of-pocket for access to investigational drugs. While Alliance
advocates for patients’ autonomy to make decisions to pay for investigational drugs, the FDA’s resistance focuses on the patient’s potential
vulnerability—willingness to sacrifice their savings and over-extend
their credit for pricey medications which offer no value and possibly
244
just false hope.
However, Alliance argues for the possibility of this
245
Conhope, regardless of its legitimacy, at any cost to the patient.
sidering a best-case scenario under Alliance’s plan, the drug companies would need to find a balance in price between covering their
costs (not necessarily making a profit) and making the drug affordable to the patient. However, maintaining this balance poses a challenge for approved, marketable drugs, making it unlikely drug companies will find a price that provides them with an incentive to offer
access to experimental drugs outside of clinical studies, while making
the drug affordable to patients of varying incomes.
4.

Limits to Manufacturing Capacity

Production of new drugs is indirectly dictated by and tailored to
246
247
the FDA’s regulations on drug approval. This FDA-centrism controls the amount of drugs produced. Considering the size of clinical
trials, ranging from a few hundred subjects to a few thousand,
248
Hence,
batches prepared for these studies are particularly small.
241

Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von Eschenbach,
495 F.3d 695, 700 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc).
242
21 C.F.R. 312.7(d)(3) (2008).
243
Brief of Appellant’s Resp. to Appellee’s Pet. for Panel Reh’g and Reh’g En
Banc at 6–7, Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 700.
244
See George J. Annas, Faith(Healing), Hope, and Charity at the FDA: The Politics of
AIDS Drug Trials, 34 VILL. L. REV. 771 (1989), for a discussion that expanding access
to investigational AIDS medications is bad public policy because it exploits vulnerable patients who are looking for hope at any cost.
245
See infra text accompanying note 259.
246
Jeffrey N. Gibbs, State Regulation of Pharmaceutical Clinical Trials, 59 FOOD &
DRUG L.J. 265, 265 (2004).
247
Id.
248
Tom Class, Expanded Access to Unapproved Medical Products: Compassionate Use,
REG. AFF. FOCUS, May 2006.
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allowing access to experimental drugs would require a major invest249
For
ment in resources to increase production for this new market.
example, ImClone has cited, as its critical roadblock in providing to
compassionate-use programs the drug Erbitux (the drug Abigail Burroughs was denied), its constraints and limits in the manufacturing
250
Due to limited manufacturing
process for these specialized drugs.
capacity and lack of out-sourcing facilities, ImClone was forced to
prioritize drug production and allocate all drugs to clinical trials,
eventually terminating its participation in any expanded use pro251
gram. In order to meet even this limited demand of the clinical trials and the expanded use programs, ImClone built its own facility to
ensure an adequate supply of the drugs, accepting the risk that Erbi252
tux might never be approved.
Drug companies would be reckless to consider increasing production of drugs at any cost when the drugs do not qualify as medical
treatment and have the potential to exacerbate a patient’s condition
or even cause death. It is not reasonable to invest in the resources to
increase manufacturing when there is no evidence that the drug is ef253
Yet another factor
fective and ultimately will be financially viable.
to consider is that in the early phases of the approval process drug
companies are still figuring out how to best manufacture the prod254
By rushing this process, the manufacturing of these drugs—
uct.
255
which still only have a six percent chance of FDA approval —might
not be optimal both for the patient’s health and for cost efficiencies
in production for the company.
5.

Access to Experimental Drugs Could Raise Ethical
Issues for Pharmaceutical Companies

Providing access to experimental drugs pushes the boundaries
on ethical issues for both the FDA and pharmaceutical companies.
Due to the nature and gravity of their business, pharmaceutical com249

Groopman, supra note 98, at 45; see also Compassionate Use Hearing, supra note
224 (statement by Dr. Robert J. Temple, Associate Director for Medical Policy at the
Center for Drug Evaluation and Research) (citing limits to drug supply and the cost
of increasing such a supply as an industry concern in providing access to investigational drugs).
250
Compassionate Use Hearing, supra note224, at 113–14 (statement by Dr. Samuel
Waksal, President and CEO of ImClone Systems, Inc.).
251
Id.
252
Id. at 120.
253
Class, supra note 248, at 13.
254
Okie, supra note 55, at 440.
255
See id. at 439.
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panies have an ethical obligation to provide the highest quality products. Since the 1962 Amendments to the FDCA, the FDA has accepted the obligation to responsibly regulate drugs and strengthen its
256
These obligations can
identity as a consumer protection agency.
conflict with the increasing emphasis on individual autonomy in
257
For instance, Alliance argues that the
American society and law.
government is too paternalistic, in that terminally ill patients should
258
be allowed to accept the greater risk in taking experimental drugs.
Alliance strongly believes that
these decisions depend greatly on the patient’s values and individual life circumstances as well as his or her cold assessment of
the statistical response rates. Are the last days of a person’s life
better spent in perhaps a painful struggle against nearly impossible odds, but with some hope and the conviction that he or she is
doing everything possible? Or is it instead better or more noble
to accept one’s fate and spend the final days saying goodbye and
hoping passively for a spontaneous remission? Is a 10% chance of
living an extra month worth hazarding a risky and painful treatment that will degrade the patient’s remaining life? Certainly [Alliance] does not know the right answers for every patient. Neither
259
. . . does the FDA.

Alliance claims that to deny a right to accept a heightened risk can be
260
viewed as administering a death sentence to sick patients.
On the
other hand, the FDA and drug companies have a duty to protect patients. Permitting companies to market drugs without evidence of efficacy could create “massive opportunity for fraud, involving people
261
Since unapproved experiwho are very sick and very desperate.”
mental drugs are not medical treatments, distribution of these drugs
to those who are desperate and dying seems unethical and cruel. Arguments have been raised that allowing access to experimental drugs
is bad public policy because it only offers false hopes to the sick, in262
ducing patients to spend energy and money grasping at straws.

256

Annas, supra note 244, at 772.
JANET L. DOLGIN & LOIS L. SHEPHERD, BIOETHICS AND THE LAW 48 (2005).
258
Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von Eschenbach,
495 F.3d 695, 699 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
259
Brief of Appellant’s Resp. to Appellee’s Pet. for Panel Reh’g and Reh’g En
Banc at 7, Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 700.
260
Sue Korach, The Abigail Alliance: Motivated by Tragic Circumstances, Families Battle
an Uncaring Bureaucracy, LIFE EXTENSION 25 (2007), available at http://abigailalliance.org/LEMSEP07pAbigailLR.pdf.
261
Okie, supra note 55, at 437.
262
Annas, supra note 244, at 785–87.
257
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Both views on the ethics of supplying experimental drugs interpret compassion differently. For patients, compassion means allowing the right to choose to accept a greater risk at the slight chance a
benefit might be received; for drug companies and the FDA, compassion is not supplying ill patients with promises and hope until a drug
263
can be proved safe and effective.
While there may be no right or
wrong answer, such considerations will come into play as drug manufacturers decide whether to voluntarily provide experimental drugs
outside of clinical trials, upsetting the current balance between protecting the safety of individuals and respecting the decision of those
who are dying.
V. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH: A LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION
While Alliance has attempted, albeit unsuccessfully, to achieve its
goals through the judicial system, legislators are seeking to expand
access to experimental drugs for Alliance’s terminally ill members
through proposed amendments to the FDCA. On November 3, 2005,
Senator Sam Brownback (R-KS) introduced the Access, Compassion,
Care and Ethics for Seriously-Ill Patients Act (ACCESS) which details
a transformation in the current FDA drug approval system for terminally ill patients, specifically an expansion on approval of fast-track
264
products.
ACCESS shifts the decision for terminally ill patients to
take investigational drugs to patients and their physicians, and conse265
quently away from the government.
A. ACCESS’s Proposal for a Reformed Drug Access Program for the
Terminally Ill
ACCESS proposes to amend the FDCA to expand access to investigational drugs for seriously ill patients who have exhausted all
treatment options, maintaining that the current drug approval standards “deny the benefits of medical progress to seriously ill patients
266
who face morbidity or death from their disease.” The Act identifies
numerous roadblocks in the current structure that limit more expedited access to investigational drugs such as the necessity of placebo
263

See id. at 792 (“True autonomy requires adequate and accurate information
upon which to base decisions. This is simply impossible in the absence of reasonable
scientific study and properly designed clinical trials.”).
264
Access, Compassion, Care and Ethics for Seriously-Ill Patients Act, S. 1956,
109th Cong. (1st Sess. 2005); see 21 U.S.C. § 356 (2000).
265
Access, Compassion, Care and Ethics for Seriously-Ill Patients Act, S. 1956,
109th Cong. (1st Sess. 2005).
266
Id. § 2.
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controlled studies, failure of compassionate-use programs, overreliance on conservative statistical analysis of clinical information
compared to a clinical evaluation, and the inability of sponsors to in267
teract with the FDA in a prompt manner. In response to these hurdles, the Act recommends an enhanced multi-tiered drug approval
268
process for this specific target group of terminally ill patients.
ACCESS seeks to allow companies to market drugs after Phase I
and II—if approved and with appropriate warnings and controls—
strictly to the seriously ill who have exhausted all available medical
269
treatment. The bill alleviates the strict requirements of clinical testing for market approval in Phase I and creates a new standard for
270
evaluation of an application. For a Phase I experimental drug to be
approved for access, the application must show enough preliminary
evidence of effectiveness for the FDA to determine “whether the totality of the information available . . . regarding the safety and effectiveness of an investigational drug . . . as compared to the risk of
morbidity or death from a condition or disease, indicates that a patient . . . may obtain more benefit than risk if treated with the
271
When an application is approved, provided the benefits
drug.”
outweigh the risks, the bill requires that as a condition to receiving
the product a patient must (1) provide written informed consent, (2)
provide a written waiver of the right to sue the manufacturer, sponsor, physician, or institution for any adverse events caused by using
the drugs, enforceable in both state and federal court, and (3) provide consent to allow the sponsor to obtain information on their us272
age for support of their drug application.
Beyond creating more flexibility in the approval process for
Phase I drugs and alleviating some drug companies’ concerns, the
ACCESS Act requires the Secretary of Health and Human Services to
establish an internal infrastructure to support such a program, and
more importantly, to create additional regulations regarding clinical

267

Id. §§ 2–3.
Id. §§ 2–3.
269
Id.
270
Id. (requiring a sponsor to submit an application which contains data and information “from completed Phase I clinical investigations and any other non-clinical or
clinical investigations . . . [which show preliminary evidence of effectiveness] based
on uncontrolled data such as case histories, information about the pharmacological
mechanism of action, data from animal and computer models, comparison with historical data, or other preliminary information . . . .”) (emphasis added).
271
Access, Compassion, Care and Ethics for Seriously-Ill Patients Act, S. 1956,
109th Cong. § 3 (1st Sess. 2005).
272
Id. § 3.
268
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273

studies and evaluations.
For example, ACCESS mandates the formation of an Accelerated Approval Advisory Committee, consisting of
independent, non-government professionals, to review applications
and issue recommendations to the Secretary for the purpose of ex274
Also, Senator Brownback proposes
pediting the approval process.
an Expanded Access Program that specifically focuses on developing
a plan to recognize and predict drugs that are likely to have a clinical
benefit for life-threatening conditions and to make available a public
list of all drugs under investigation which may be candidates for
275
Phase I and II marketing approval.
Much more drastic than these two provisions, ACCESS also flatly
prohibits placebo-only or non-treatment-only controls in clinical trials
with “respect to any life-threatening condition or disease where reasonably effective approved alternative therapies exist for the specific
276
This regulation ensures patients would not be presindication.”
sured into a controlled clinical environment, where they may or may
not receive an experimental drug, provided that a reasonable drug
has been approved for this specific use by the agency in the expanded
use program. Finally, in evaluating clinical information, the Act instructs the Secretary to give equal weight to clinical judgment and sta277
tistical analysis to determine safety and effectiveness, prohibiting
denial of an application “based solely on the basis of a statistical analysis or the rigid use of the ninety-five percent confidence level con278
vention.”
B. Response to ACCESS by Interest Groups
Critics have labeled ACCESS as “bad law,” noting many of the
similar criticisms and concerns identified in Alliance’s proposal and

273

Id. §§ 2–6.
Id. § 3.
275
Id.
276
Id. § 4.
277
Access, Compassion, Care and Ethics for Seriously-Ill Patients Act, S. 1956,
109th Cong. § 6 (1st Sess. 2005). The ACCESS Act notes that non-statistical measures
shall include but are not limited to: clinical evaluation information such as case history reports, scientific and clinical studies designed to measure or define mechanisms of action or molecular targeting, data from animal and computer models,
comparisons with historical data, evaluations of the adverse effect of delaying the
availability of an investigational drug to even a small subpopulation of seriously ill
patients and scientific, observational, or clinical studies designed and conducted to
collect well-documented information. Id.
278
Id. § 6.
274
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279

litigation.
The clinical research community is most alarmed, questioning the lenient standard of approval for Phase I drugs and the
sponsor’s confidence in evidence of drug efficacy without random280
ized trials. Specifically, there is concern that the Act’s allowance of
pre-clinical data to be evaluated by a risk-benefit standard may cause
281
The Society of Clinical Trials notes
all drugs to appear promising.
that sponsors only proceed with drug approval past Phase I if the
drugs are promising, but the harsh reality is that most cancer drugs
(indeed, most drugs treating any disease) eventually fail for efficacy
282
or safety reasons.
The general fear is that the terminally ill will be
faced with broad access to experimental drugs, but in actuality access
will be gained only to ineffective and harmful drugs without any
283
means to qualify these drugs for decision-making purposes.
The clinical community has also challenged the bill’s repudia284
tion of the accepted scientific method for testing drugs. While critics concede that the drug approval process is rigorous, history has
shown that the most reliable data and information is obtained from
285
Interference with this gold standard of
randomized clinical trials.
testing has the potential to undermine years of medical and scientific
findings.
Lastly, critics raise ethical issues regarding ACCESS directed at
protecting terminally ill patients from coercion and liability assumption. By permitting marketing approval post–Phase I, drug compa286
nies will be permitted to charge for their experimental drugs.
Without any controls on pricing, companies may take advantage of
287
vulnerable patients. Such susceptibility increases when patients are
288
While allowing a blanket
required to assume all liability for risk.
waiver of liability is the price to be paid to motivate participation by
the drug companies, patient advocates are concerned that ACCESS

279

Colin Begg et al., The Society for Clinical Trials Opposes US Legislation to Permit
Marketing of Unproven Medical Therapies for Seriously Ill Patients, 3 CLINICAL TRIALS 154,
157 (2006).
280
Id. at 155–56.
281
Id. at 155.
282
Id.
283
Id.
284
Id.
285
Begg et al., supra note 279, at 155.
286
Id.
287
Id.
288
George J. Annas, Cancer and the Constitution—Choice at Life’s End, 357 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 408, 411 (2007).
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does not provide the appropriate balance for protection of patient
289
rights and interests.
On the other hand, the bill has attracted strong supporters and
advocates for expanding patients’ rights. Supporters have defended
the more flexible Phase I approval standard for the terminally ill by
claiming that time spent in pre-clinical testing does not necessarily
prevent drug tragedies because doctors and drug companies tend to
290
learn more about drugs after approval than before. Those who defend ACCESS hold firm to the conviction that it is unethical to expose seriously ill patients to the potential use of placebo medications
291
Despite this support, currently the ACCESS Act
in a clinical trial.
292
has not been enacted.
C. FDA Responds with Proposed Expanded Access to Investigational
Drugs for Treatment Use Rule
The FDA has initiated its own proposal to expand access to investigational new drugs for patients with serious life-threatening dis293
eases who lack therapeutic options.
This proposed rule—the Expanded Access to Investigational Drugs for Treatment Use (EAID)—
augments the extant expanded access programs by clarifying and
294
These regulations work at imamending the existing regulations.
proving the effectiveness of the existing “compassionate-use” programs by addressing the inconsistencies in the application process,
elaborating on the requirements and safeguards in the programs,
295
and creating flexibility in the review process on a case-by-case basis.
289

Id.
Univ. of Texas Anderson Cancer Ctr., Phase I Clinical Trials Program: Improving
Access to Investigational Drugs, 3 BENCH TO BEDSIDE & BACK, Winter / Spring 2007, at 1.
291
Id.
292
Kaisernetwork.org, Kaiser Daily Health Policy Report: Lawmakers to Reintroduce Bill Legalizing Terminally Ill Patients’ Access to Experimental Medications
(Aug. 17, 2007), http://www.kaisernetwork.org/daily_reports/print_report.cfm?
DR_ID=46955&dr_cat=3 (last visited Nov. 4, 2008).
293
Expanded Access to Investigational Drugs for Treatment Use, 71 Fed. Reg.
75,147 (Dec. 14, 2006) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 312).
294
Id.
295
Id. at 75,149–51.
The FDA clearly identifies the main goal of this rule to address concerns including inconsistent application of access policies and programs and inequities in access based on relative sophistication of the
setting in which a patient is treated or on the patient’s disease or condition. By describing in detail in the proposed rule the criteria, submission requirements, and safeguards for the different types of expanded access for treatment uses of investigational drugs, the agency
seeks to increase awareness and knowledge of expanded use programs
290
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The EAID rule mandates three criteria to qualify for the ex296
panded use programs. First, the patient must suffer from a serious
disease or a condition lacking satisfactory therapeutic treatment al297
ternatives.
While this is consistent with the current regulation, the
FDA clarifies the “lack of comparable or satisfactory therapeutic alternatives” to mean that the patient has exhausted all available FDAapproved therapies and has failed to respond to these therapies or is
298
In addition, the FDA may require the patient
intolerant of them.
to exhaust treatment options not regulated by the FDA if such alter299
natives are supported by compelling literature evidence.
A second
criterion for the proposed expanded use program is that the FDA
“must determine that the potential patient benefit justifies the potential risks of the treatment use and that those potential risks are not
unreasonable in the context of the disease or condition to be
300
The final criterion states that the FDA must assure that
treated.”
providing access to investigational drugs will not interfere with any
301
stage of clinical testing.
With the concern of protecting clinical
testing, the EAID rule restricts acceptance into the expanded use
program for any individuals able to participate in a clinical trial, but
recognizes that participation will not be denied if the patient has
been rejected from a trial due to their stage of the disease, has an intolerance to the active control in the randomized trial, or has limitations due to geographical location that make participation in a trial
302
impossible.
While EAID focuses on elaborating on the current expanded use
programs, the proposed rule makes a drastic concession to proponents of both Alliance’s mission and the ACCESS Act. The proposed
regulation fails to require a particular level of safety or effectiveness
to merit access to an investigational drug, leaving such decisions to be
determined on an individualized basis by evaluating the seriousness
and the procedures for obtaining investigational drugs. Increased
knowledge and awareness about expanded access options should make
investigational drugs more available in the appropriate situations.
Id. These goals address the weaknesses of “compassionate-use” programs identified
before Congress. See Compassionate Use Hearing, supra note 224.
296
Expanded Access to Investigational Drugs for Treatment Use, 71 Fed. Reg.
75,150–51 (Dec. 14, 2006) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 312).
297
Id. at 75,150–51.
298
Id.
299
Id.
300
Id.
301
Id.
302
Expanded Access to Investigational Drugs for Treatment Use, 71 Fed. Reg.
75,147, 75,153 (Dec. 14, 2006) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 312).
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303

of the disease and the size of the group. The proposal dictates that
as the seriousness of a patient’s disease increases, access to investigational drugs which have completed Phase I testing and have been
supported by preliminary evidence of effectiveness could be in304
creased. However, as the patient-group size grows—for example, if
the expanded use application is submitted on behalf of larger patient
populations—the FDA will demand a higher level of evidentiary find305
Most likely, drugs will have to be
ings for safety and effectiveness.
306
The EAID regulation creates a metested through Phase II or III.
chanism for the FDA to balance all the information available—testing
results on safety and effectiveness, seriousness of the disease, and size
of the sample group—to come to an individualized decision for each
submission which responsibly assesses the benefits and risks.
While patients are given the possibility of increased flexibility for
the opportunity of gaining access, EAID leaves the practical burden
of meeting compliance standards for the program on physicians and
307
To initiate the entire process, drug manufacturdrug companies.
ers or sponsors are obligated to file a detailed submission under the
308
expanded access program to qualify its drug for access.
If approved, the drugs will be administered by a sponsoring physician or
“investigator” who is required to report adverse experiences to the
sponsor, ensure informed consent, obtain Institutional Review Board
309
approval, and maintain case histories and drug disposition records.
Additionally, the proposal suggests that the FDA has the authority to
require the sponsor to monitor a patient’s use of an investigational
drug, if access to this drug is authorized to continue past the rule’s
310
limited duration of a single course of therapy.
VI. THE BEST PROMISE OF HOPE: FDA’S EXPANDED ACCESS TO
INVESTIGATIONAL DRUGS FOR TREATMENT USE RULE
The success of a program permitting access to investigational
drugs demands participation and cooperation among Congress, the
FDA, pharmaceutical companies, physicians, and patients, coupled

303

Id. at 75,151.
Id.
305
Id.
306
Id.
307
Id. at 75,151–52.
308
Expanded Access to Investigational Drugs for Treatment Use, 71 Fed. Reg.
75,147, 75,152 (Dec. 14, 2006) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 312).
309
Id.
310
Id. at 75,153.
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with a compromise on the balance between patient autonomy and
consumer protection.
Unfortunately, Alliance’s litigation, the
ACCESS Act, and the proposed EAID rule all miss the mark in this
respect. Alliance’s litigation makes large demands on behalf of its
members without implementation of any infrastructure to support
the envisioned changes. On the other hand, the ACCESS Act provides the necessary structure through practical concessions for liability waivers, pricing provisions, and the establishment of committees
and boards to implement the program. However, the ACCESS Act’s
overly lenient approval process and disregard for established clinical
testing methods make it too controversial to muster the required
support to get the bill approved. Although Congress is the proper forum to address this issue, the proposed EAID rule strikes the desired
compromise between patient autonomy and consumer protection by
expanding and clarifying the already existing “compassionate-use”
programs. However, maintaining this new balance will still require
more incentives to encourage drug company participation.
Ironically, and most likely a result of Alliance’s lobbying, the
FDA itself is seeking to shift the balance and to formulate a reasonable compromise, blending aspects of Alliance’s and the ACCESS
Act’s goals with a more conservative consumer protection approach.
The FDA is obviously in a precarious position because any change
opens the agency up for criticism if insidious drug access is allowed.
Conversely, if the agency does not act quickly enough, it will be criticized for being too restrictive in getting effective drugs to the market.
Clearly neither perspective—the libertarian or the liberal—will ever
be totally satisfied; however, if compromise is to be made between
both perspectives (which is obviously debatable), the FDA has found
the appropriate compromise by evaluating each expanded access use
on a case-by-case basis. By improving on an already established program, the FDA’s proposal allows the agency to maintain its role as
consumer protectors but affords the flexibility—only when all circumstances align properly—for the FDA to meet the desire of dying
patients to accept the potential risk of using experimental drugs.
However, even the FDA admits that its own proposal may be futile due to its lack of authority to compel drug companies to supply
311
Concerns about liability, therainvestigational drugs to patients.
peutic misconception, manufacturing capacity, informed consent,
311

Id. at 75,150 (“While this proposed rule aims to clarify, and thereby expand,
the situations in which expanded access to unapproved drugs could be available, under its existing authority, FDA cannot compel a drug manufacturer to provide access
to investigational drugs for treatment use.”).
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and pricing are left largely unaddressed. To make this proposal effective, revisions must be made to encourage drug company participation and to further protect patients. First, the proposal must provide a safeguard for therapeutic misconception by creating an
evaluation process whereby the patient is counseled and educated regarding the drug and instructed that no personal benefit may be
gained from its use. This process should be headed by the FDA or
Institutional Review Boards, incorporating either the sponsor or the
physician, and the patient’s comprehension and state of mind regarding their access should be a factor in determining access. While this
may be an administrative and logistical burden, this procedural safeguard protects patients and should involve the implementation of a
waiver of liability for sponsors, manufacturers, and physicians who
encourage participation in the program. Patients who are demanding the right to assume the risk of experimental drugs must concede
any claims of liability to make the program effective. This concession
is balanced by a patient-protective informed consent process; a liability waiver will not be coercive or unethical provided a safeguard is in
place to counteract therapeutic misconception by balancing the reality of the risk with the possible benefits.
The EAID proposal also needs to specifically address the pricing
of experimental drugs through the expanded access program. The
provisions of EAID place increased burdens on drug companies, in
regard to their involvement in the expanded access program, yet fail
to create any incentives for the drug companies to accept these encumbrances. The proposal only allows companies to be reimbursed
for direct and select administrative costs. Experimental drugs should
be priced so as to permit pharmaceutical companies to break even on
their production of the drugs. This break-even price should include
the administrative costs of running and monitoring an expanded use
program, an allocation of production fixed and variable costs, cost of
delivering investigational drugs, and an allocation of the research
and development costs. Additionally, the drug sponsor should incorporate into the price a fixed percentage increase on the base costs
accounting for the historical percentage of losses incurred in its expanded use program from production of drugs which are never utilized. This provision encourages manufacturers to increase production for the expanded use programs without the fear of being stuck
with the financial costs and a stockpile of drugs if the drugs are never
accepted in the program or if the drugs are subsequently found not
to be safe and effective. Obviously, these favorable pricing concessions raise ethical and fairness issues for patients: either only the
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wealthy will be able to afford the medications or desperate patients
will be forced to sacrifice their life savings for the hope of some therapeutic benefit. As part of this comprehensive program, the government must consider practical ways to fund access for patients in
need. One suggestion may be to create a common patient pool of
funds contributed by drug companies, the government, private citizens, and interest groups.
Finally, the proposed EAID rule needs to address the manufacturing capacity lag identified as a problem by pharmaceutical companies in supplying drugs to the current compassionate-use pro312
The major roadblock in the current compassionate-use
gram.
program is the time constraints for drug companies to ramp up pro313
duction of new investigational drugs.
In order to overcome these
manufacturing-time limitations, the EAID must implement a committee and process whereby investigational drugs are identified as potential drugs for compassionate-use. This would involve increased communication between drug manufacturers and the FDA about the
sponsor’s progress in clinical trials and pre-emptive discussions with
scientific and medical experts as to their recommendations. Early
identification, coupled with a provision that allows companies to be
reimbursed through the pricing mechanism for wasted production,
will help encourage drug companies to start increasing manufacturing capacity as soon as reasonably possible.
VII. CONCLUSION
The tension between the promotion of safe and effective drugs
and the demand for faster approval is a natural and inevitable consequence of pre-market drug approval. Competing interests will continue to push and pull in opposing directions, while the government,
fearing the backlash of a Thalidomide-like disaster, hopes to find a
balance that satisfies and protects both patients and drug companies.
A perfect balance, of course, may not be achievable, but the closest
and easiest compromise comes in the FDA’s form of individualized
exceptions. The FDA’s proposed EAID rule manages to address and
attempt to fix the failures in the current compassionate-use program,
while also expanding the program to allow the possibility of meeting
Alliance’s demands for post–Phase I access to experimental drugs.
312

See Compassionate Use Hearing, supra note 224, at 113–15 (statements from Dr.
Waskal of ImClone) (stating that manufacturing has been the major roadblock for
getting drugs to expand access programs since the plants are not equipped to produce drugs on a larger scale and it takes time to scale up production).
313
Id.
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However, the success of providing increased access to experimental
drugs will depend on the participation of drug companies, and more
specifically, tailoring a program to offer enough incentives to drug
manufacturers while not sacrificing patients’ rights. Through the
above-mentioned adaptations to the EAID proposal, the compassionate-use programs will be a success and have the potential to meet
desperate patients’ needs while being equally advantageous for drug
companies. While Alliance’s litigation has been and will continue to
be futile in gaining access to experimental drugs, Alliance’s dedication to advocating for their desperate patients might bring relief to
the terminally ill in the form of a proposal from the FDA.

